

















































































































































The	 EU27	 European	 Council	 has	 confirmed	 ‘its	 readiness	 to	 initiate	 work	
towards	 a	 balanced,	 ambitious	 and	 wide-ranging	 free	 trade	 agreement	 (FTA)	
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insofar	as	there	are	sufficient	guarantees	 for	a	 level	playing	field	 ...	[which]	will	
be	finalised	and	concluded	once	the	UK	is	no	longer	a	Member	State.’	However,	it	
opined,	 ‘Being	outside	the	Customs	Union	and	the	Single	Market	will	 inevitably	
lead	 to	 frictions	 in	 trade.	 This	 unfortunately	 will	 have	 negative	 economic	






tariffs	 or	 quotas.	 And	 …	 we	must	 ensure	 that,	 as	 now,	 products	 only	 need	 to	
undergo	 one	 series	 of	 approvals,	 in	 one	 country,	 to	 show	 that	 they	 meet	 the	
required	 regulatory	 standards.’	 In	 the	 same	 speech	 she	 also	 repeated	 the	UK’s	
determination	to	avoid	recreating	‘a	hard	border	between	Northern	Ireland	and	
Ireland’,	 or	 to	 breaking	 up	 ‘the	 United	 Kingdom’s	 own	 common	 market	 by	
creating	 a	 customs	 and	 regulatory	 border	 down	 the	 Irish	 Sea’.	 In	 rejecting	
continued	 membership	 of	 a	 customs	 union,	 she	 correctly	 remarked	 that	 this	
‘would	not	be	compatible	with	a	meaningful	independent	trade	policy’,	which	is	
one	 of	 the	UK	Government’s	 ambitions:	 ‘A	 Global	 Britain	which	…	 reaches	 out	
beyond	our	continent,	to	trade	with	nations	across	the	globe.’	
How	 these	 rather	 conflicting	 objectives	 can	 be	 reconciled	 is	 as	 yet	 unclear.	
Regulatory	 provisions,	 relating	 to	 food	 safety	 and	 animal	 and	 plant	 health	 for	
example,	 together	 with	 the	 high	 tariffs	 on	 many	 agri-food	 products,	 put	 the	
agriculture	and	 food	 sectors	at	 the	 core	of	 the	debate	 (Swinbank,	2018).	Many	
commentators	 have	 suggested	 that	 the	 border	 between	 Northern	 Ireland	 and	
Ireland	 is	 particularly	 problematic.	 Addressing	 this	 concern	 in	 her	 Mansion	
house	 speech,	 Mrs	 May	 (2018)	 made	 two	 suggestions.	 Neither	 attracted	 the	
support	 of	 either	 the	 Irish	 Government	 or	 of	 the	 EU27	 negotiator.	 One	 –	 later	
referred	to	as	a	‘maximum	facilitation’	arrangement	–	would	use	as-yet	unproven	
technology	 to	 create	 as	 frictionless	 a	 border	 as	 possible.	 The	 second,	 later	





the	 EU	 for	 those	 goods	 arriving	 in	 the	 UK	 and	 intended	 for	 the	 EU.	 By	
following	this	approach,	we	would	know	that	all	goods	entering	the	EU	via	the	
UK	pay	 the	right	EU	duties,	 removing	 the	need	 for	customs	processes	at	 the	
UK-EU	border.’		
It	is	very	difficult	to	envisage	how	this	might	work	without	a	massive	increase	in	









could	 be	 avoided	 from	 1	 January	 2021,	 once	 the	 transition	 period	 is	 over,	 if	
arrangements	for	frictionless	trade	could	not	be	negotiated	to	the	EU27’s	liking.	
Three	 months	 later	 the	 Draft	 Agreement	 still	 contained	 a	 Protocol	 on	
Ireland/Northern	Ireland.	Most	 of	 this	was	un-shaded:	 i.e.	 not	 agreed.	Article	 4	
read:	 ‘The	territory	of	Northern	Ireland	…	shall	be	considered	to	be	part	of	 the	
customs	territory	of	the	[European]	Union’,	and	‘Customs	duties	on	imports	and	
exports	 …	 shall	 be	 prohibited	 between	 the	 Union	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 in	
respect	of	Northern	Ireland’	(European	Commission,	2018).	Article	5	–	again	un-
agreed	–		on	‘Agriculture	and	Fisheries’	insists	that	much	European	Union	law	on	
sanitary	 and	 phytosanitary	 matters,	 and	 ‘on	 the	 production	 and	 marketing	 of	
agricultural	and	fisheries	products’,	would	continue	to	apply	in	Northern	Ireland.	
This	 contrasts	 sharply	with	 Theresa	May’s	 (2018)	 rejection	 of	 ‘a	 customs	 and	
























































Trade	 facilitation	 costs	might	 increase	 because	 of	 checks	 to	 ensure	 regulatory	










































As	 a	WTO	Member	 the	 UK	would	 be	 able	 to	 apply	 sanitary	 and	 phytosanitary	




















































































































































this	 list	 includes	 a	 complaint	 that	 ‘The	 EU	 requires	 that	 for	 a	 product	 to	 be	
labeled	 ‘whiskey’	(or	 ‘whisky’),	 it	must	be	aged	a	minimum	of	three	years’;	and	
that	proposals	for	a	new	Renewable	Energy	Directive	would	‘introduce	onerous	
and	 complex	 sustainability	 criteria	 for	 biomass	 and	 could	 be	 extremely	
problematic	for	U.S.	exports	of	sustainable	wood	pellets’	(Lighthizer,	2018:	165	
&	161).	
Modelling	Brexit’s	impact	on	the	agri-food	sector	
This	article	does	not	attempt	to	review	the	growing	literature	that	attempts	to	
model	the	impact	of	various	Brexit	scenarios	on	the	agri-food	sector.	Two	studies	
have	been	reported	in	this	volume	(Hubbard	et	al.,	and	van	Berkum	et	al.)	and	
papers	by	Jongeneel	et	al.	(2016)	and	Feng	et	al.	(2017)	were	published	in	earlier	
issues	of	EuroChoices.	Mention	might	also	be	made	of	Bellora	et	al.’s	(2017)	work	
reported	to	the	European	Parliament,	and	Bradley	and	Hill’s	(2017)	study	for	the	
Agricultural	and	Horticultural	Development	Board.		
Four	components	have	typically	been	identified	in	the	modelling	studies	to	date:	
i)	changes	to	the	tariff	regime	and	trade	facilitation	costs,	ii)	reductions	and/or	
modifications	in	taxpayer	support	for	farming	and	the	rural	environment,	iii)	EU	
migration	and	access	to	labour,	and	iv)	a	change	in	the	regulatory	regime.	A	
number	of	policy	choices	have	yet	to	be	made	which	will	impact	on	the	future	
fortunes	of	the	farm	and	food	industries,	consumers,	and	the	rural	environment,	
and	models	will	continue	to	differ	in	how	they	do	or	do	not	treat	these	variables	
and	their	possible	linkages.	
What	the	overall	impact	of	Brexit	on	the	economy	will	be	is	still	debated.	
Tangermann,	in	this	issue,	suggests	it	will	be	‘significant’.	A	number	of	free	
market	advocates,	however,	still	insist	that	greater	economic	prosperity	can	be	
gained	by	breaking	completely	from	the	EU,	its	tariffs,	and	its	policies.	Patrick	
Minford	for	example,	based	on	results	from	his	World	Trade	Model,	believes	that	
to	achieve	this	‘It	is	absolutely	essential,	whatever	other	decisions	are	taken,	that	
the	UK	government	withdraws	totally	and	unconditionally	from	the	CAP	and	all	
its	associated	tariffs	on	agricultural	products’	(Economists	for	Free	Trade,	2017).	
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Much	uncertainty	remains	
Despite	the	title	of	this	paper,	and	the	confidence	Theresa	May’s	administration	
has	expressed,	much	in	fact	remains	to	be	legally	determined.	Many	aspects	of	
the	Brexit	process	are	still	hotly	contested.	Furthermore,	the	article’s	coverage	of	
issues	has	been	less	than	complete.	We	know,	for	example,	that	the	UK	must	
establish	its	own	Schedule	of	Commitments	when	it	resumes	its	place	in	the	
WTO,	but	when	and	how	this	is	to	be	done	remains	unsettled.	As	this	article	goes	
to	press	the	withdrawal	negotiations	are	continuing.	As	and	when	you	read	this,	
you	might	have	a	clearer	picture	of	how	the	negotiations	have	progressed.	
	
Summary	
Brexit	negotiations	were	triggered	in	March	2017	when	the	UK	notified	its	
intention	to	leave	the	EU.	A	year	later,	a	draft	Withdrawal	Agreement	was	
produced.	It	is	hoped	that	this	will	result	in	a	legally	binding	agreement	when	the	
European	Council	meets	in	autumn	2018,	but	this	is	not	guaranteed.	The	draft	
provides	for	a	transitional	period,	extending	from	March	2019	–	when	the	UK	
will	formally	leave	the	EU	–	to	the	end	of	2020,	during	which	time	EU	law	and	
policies	–	including	the	common	agricultural	policy	–	will	continue	to	apply.	The	
UK-EU27	trade	arrangements	that	will	apply	from	1	January	2021	are	yet	to	be	
determined.	Both	the	UK	and	EU27	insist	they	are	determined	to	keep	open	the	
Irish	border,	but	how	this	outcome	can	be	reconciled	with	the	UK’s	stated	
ambition	of	forging	new	trade	links	around	the	world,	is	yet	to	be	determined.	
Regulatory	provisions,	relating	to	food	safety	and	animal	and	plant	health	for	
example,	together	with	the	high	tariffs	on	many	agri-food	products,	put	the	
agriculture	and	food	sectors	at	the	core	of	this	debate.	Direct	payments	will	be	
phased	out	in	England,	but	the	scope	for	policy	divergence	between	the	various	
nations	of	the	UK	is	uncertain.	
Pullquote	
“There	is	no	guarantee	that	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	will	be	successfully	
negotiated…thus	there	is	still	the	possibility	of	an	abrupt	Brexit	in	March	2019”	
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